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Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation 
Joseph W. Mead – Cleveland State University 
Most discussions of the policy context for nonprofits in the United States focus on federal 
or state restrictions. Fundraising charities, however, must comply not only with myriad 
state requirements but an uncertain number of local requirements as well. Based on a 
survey of the largest cities in the United States, I find that all of these cities have some 
restrictions on charitable solicitation. Several of the cities also impose extensive 
registration requirements and other restrictions. These findings highlight the need for 
nonprofits to be aware of local regulation of their activities. 
Keywords: Nonprofit Policy, Fundraising, Charitable Solicitation 
Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation 
“Public fundraising is widely seen as a natural right of charitable organizations” (Hu & Guo, 2016, 
p. 213). From an organizational perspective, charitable solicitation—i.e., communication seeking
a donation—is an important mechanism by which organizations that are reliant on voluntary 
action sustain themselves. At a macro level, charitable solicitation reflects a literal marketplace of 
ideas where organizations pitch their causes in order to receive support from the public. These 
pitches can include things such as applying for grants; mailing, emailing, or telephoning former 
or future donors; engaging in media marketing campaigns; or including a donation button on 
their website or social media platform. 
Most states regulate charitable solicitation in some way, whether through point-of-solicitation 
disclosure requirements, registration mandates, or laws against fraud (Barber & Farwell, 2016a, 
b; Dietz, Barber, Lott, & Shelly, 2017; Sullivan, 2004). Although revenue generation can take 
many forms, charitable solicitation laws are usually limited to requests for donation rather than 
attempts to raise money through the sale of merchandise. Some efforts to regulate charitable 
solicitation have been controversial. These efforts have led to difficult questions about the 
enforceability, cost, and constitutionality of charitable solicitation regulation (Breen, 2009; 
Fishman, 2015; Inazu, 2009). 
Although a great deal of literature has focused on state laws that regulate charitable solicitation, 
the local regulation of charitable solicitation has largely gone unstudied. In fact, the nonprofit 
sector itself has often turned a blind eye to local requirements. Yet, thousands of local 
governments impose restrictions on charitable solicitation activities. These restrictions range 
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from trivial to severe. Indeed, the findings in this article show that all of the surveyed cities 
regulate solicitation in some form. Many cities impose severe burdens on soliciting charities to 
apply for a permit, compile and make public detailed information about the organization, and pay 
fees. These laws often apply to solicitation that occurs by any means—including mail, telephone, 
email, and/or through the internet—even when the organization has no other presence in the city. 
For example, Columbus (Ohio) requires all charitable organizations to apply for a permit at least 
30 days before soliciting residents. Although this law has been on the books for years, the city 
amended the law in 2017 to make it explicit that the requirements apply to solicitation by any 
means—“by mail, email or any other written or electronically published article, or over radio, 
television, telephone or telegraph” (Columbus Ord. 525.15). Additionally, all organizations 
soliciting in the city must fill out a six-page application that is unique to Columbus. These 
organizations must also provide supporting documents and pay a filing fee. Over a recent 18-
month period, more than 400 organizations obtained a permit to solicit donations in Columbus. 
Many of these organizations, however, were located in other states. Still, all of the organizations 
will be required to reapply for a soliciting permit each year. They will also be required to submit a 
yearly report describing the amount of funds that they raised. 
Even though enforcement action against noncomplying charities is rare (Fishman, 2015), cautious 
or dutiful organizations may expend considerable effort to learn of their legal obligations in each 
locale. This could add up for organizations. For instance, a national campaign with a broad donor 
base that seeks to comply with all legal obligations would need to verify laws in thousands of cities 
and adhere to the regulations each city imposes. As a new wave of constitutional challenges to the 
regulation of charitable solicitation emerge and questions persist about the effectiveness of other 
forms of regulation, cities may start to take a fresh look at their role in regulating solicitation in 
the nonprofit sector. 
Background 
Layers of Regulation Regarding Nonprofit Activity 
Most scholarship about the policy context in which nonprofits operate in the United States begins 
and ends at either the federal or the state level. At the federal level, the Internal Revenue Service’s 
(IRS) administration of tax-exempt status for organizations provides one of the most highly 
visible modes of control over the nonprofit sector. On the other hand, states supply the governing 
principles of incorporation and board duties. 
Debates about the proper level of government to regulate the nonprofit sector, therefore, have 
usually been framed within the context of either federal or state governments (as well as 
appropriate types of enforcement agencies) (Freemont-Smith, 2004). For example, some scholars 
have called for more uniformity in how nonprofits are regulated by centralizing more functions, 
such as more coordination between states and the IRS or the establishment of an independent 
regulatory agency (Freemont-Smith, 2004; Mayer, 2016; Mayer & Wilson, 2010; Nave, 2004). 
Others have noted that there has been an unceasing march toward federalization of nonprofit 
regulation (Ascher, 2014; Fishman, 2009; Hopkins, 1980; Silber, 2005). 
The bulk of this literature on nonprofit regulation offers little discussion of the local context. 
However, local government regulation of charities can significantly affect the day-to-day 
operations of many nonprofits. Some of the more common local regulations include payments in 
lieu of taxes (PILOTs) (Brody, 2010; Fei, Hines, & Horwitz, 2016; Grønbjerg, McGiverin-Bohan, 
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Dula, & Miller, 2016; McGiverin-Bohan, Grønbjerg, Dula, & Miller, 2016), programmatic choices 
or requirements for government funding or grants (Farrell, Fyffe, & Valero, 2015; Fyall, 2017; 
Pettijohn, Boris, & Farrell, 2016), and public-private partnerships (Mendel & Brudney, 2012). 
Less studied aspects of local regulation include nonprofit specific zoning codes or land use 
controls targeting charitable activities (Galvan, 2006). 
Of course, nonprofits influence policy as well and the effects of this influence can be most dramatic 
at the local level (Mosley & Grogan, 2013). Thus, the tendency for scholarship on nonprofit policy 
to focus exclusively on federal and state regulations leaves a gap in our understanding of local 
level impacts. 
Federalism of Charitable Solicitation 
Historically in the US regulation of individual solicitation (i.e., begging) has taken place in various 
forms for centuries (Quigley, 1996, 1997). However, regulation of organizational solicitation is a 
more recent occurrence given that this type of solicitation was far less common in the United 
States until the twentieth century (Barber, 2011, 2017; Cutlip, 1990; Hopkins, 1980). As 
professional fundraising became more common and concerns about fraud and excessive costs 
emerged, local restrictions were put in place (Cutlip, 1990). Following World War II, and 
prompted by concerns of fraudulent or inefficient charities, states began adopting laws to register 
and restrict charitable solicitation (Barber, 2011). 
One approach that states adopted was placing caps on the amount of money that soliciting 
charities could spend on fundraising. These caps were common starting in the 1970s but were 
declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court in a trilogy of decisions in the 1980s (Harris, 
Holley, & McCaffrey, 1990; Inazu, 2009). In lieu of outright prohibitions on organizations 
soliciting donations, states sought to require that solicitors disclose certain information to the 
state and, upon request, to the individuals they were soliciting. States also started targeting 
particularly egregious cases of fraud by telemarketers under generic state consumer protection 
laws. 
Since then, charitable solicitation laws have stood relatively unchanged. This is despite advances 
in technology and shifts in giving behavior (Child, 2016). Indeed, the rise of webpages, email, and 
social media have all changed the way that donations are now sought and received (Maloney & 
Rosenthal, 2017). Trends in crowdfunding and peer-to-peer donations, along with other changes 
to the charitable sector (including the rise of for-profit, hybrid, and social enterprise forms of 
charity), have left state charitable solicitation rules—some of which still regulate fundraising by 
telegraph—somewhat outdated. 
Despite these few attempts to regulate charitable solicitation at the federal level, the federal 
government has mostly taken a hands-off approach to dealing with charitable solicitation 
(Fishman, 2015). For example, the pressures of World War II led to national regulation 
concerning charities that sought relief related to the war (Barber, 2017). And, in the 1990s, the 
IRS attempted to revoke the tax-exempt status of an organization that spent an excessive amount 
(in the IRS’s view) on fundraising. On appeal, however, while sending the dispute back to the tax 
court the appellate court concluded that the tax code’s prohibition on private inurement did 
“not…empower the IRS to monitor the terms of arm’s length contracts made by charitable 
organizations with the firms that supply them with essential inputs, whether premises, paper, 
computers, legal advice, or fundraising services” (United Cancer Council v. Comm’r, 1999, p. 
1176). 
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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has also made only a light foray into regulating charitable 
solicitation; and, these regulations have only focused on telemarketing by commercial entities. 
Specifically, commercial telemarketers must respect the national do-not-call registry and they are 
prohibited from engaging in fraud. These FTC regulations, though, do not pertain to charitable 
organizations at large (Cain, 2004). Several proposed bills that would have expanded federal 
oversight of charitable solicitation have died in Congress over the years (Hopkins & Kirkpatrick, 
2013); and, other than these modest federal forays into the regulation of charitable solicitation, 
charitable solicitation has largely not been under federal regulation. 
Limits to the Regulation of Charitable Solicitation 
Aggressive and selective enforcement of charitable solicitation has prompted courts to intervene. 
The US Supreme Court, for example, has upheld the finding that charitable solicitation is 
protected free speech. Based on several decisions between 1940 and 1990, the Court somewhat 
limited the policy options available to any level of government seeking to regulate charitable 
solicitation. The Court did so by first establishing that governmental disagreement with an 
organization’s mission or how it accomplishes that mission does not allow it to prevent that 
organization’s solicitation of donations (although under some circumstances governments can 
modify the tax treatment of donations) (Bray, Hasey, & Hensley, 2017). The one possible 
exception to this rule allows government to outlaw solicitation by organizations that finance 
terrorism (Bell, 2007). Secondly, as noted above, the Supreme Court has also rejected statutory 
caps that prohibit organizations from seeking donations if they have excessive fundraising 
expenses (Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 1988). Third, the Court has upheld limits to 
which types of disclosures government can require at the time of solicitation (Harris et al., 1990). 
Every state has the power to prohibit misleading or fraudulent solicitation. However, uncovering 
and then prosecuting fraud is often difficult; and, staff capacity and political constraints tend to 
limit the effectiveness of this power (Lott et al., 2016; Sullivan, 2004). In response, state 
governments have enacted a mix of mandates on charities that solicit in their state. These 
mandates—such as registration, financial reports, and disclosures to donors—often fall along the 
outer edge of what the Constitution allows. 
Rationales for Regulating Charitable Solicitation 
As shown in Table 1, scholarship on government regulation of charitable solicitation can be 
grouped into three categories based on regulatory objective: 1) to empower donors to make more 
informed decisions with their donations, 2) to ensure that donated funds reach the intended 
beneficiary, and/or 3) to advance an interest of government or a government official rather than 
the charitable sector (Barber & Farwell, 2016a; Breen, 2009; Irvin, 2005). 
Empowering Donors. Requiring organizations to submit registration forms, in theory, provides 
donors with an opportunity to access accurate information from which they can base their 
donative decisions. Similarly, point-of-solicitation disclosure requirements provide potential 
donors with relevant information about soliciting charities and allows them to exercise judgment 
before writing a check (Barber & Farwell, 2016b). 
One might question whether increased donor control over organizations is beneficial for the 
nonprofit sector (Ostrander, 2007) or whether donors even make wise giving choices at all 
(Steinberg & Morris, 2010). Even assuming the worthiness of the goal of increased donor control, 
there has been mixed empirical evidence that regulations or disclosure requirements actually 
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Table 1. Regulatory Objectives of Charitable Solicitation Regulations 
Regulatory 




knowledge to make 
informed decision 
Require disclosure of 
relevant info at the time 
of solicitation 
• Assumes disclosure is clear and
relevant
• Assumes motives of donors




b; Breen, 2009; 
Steinberg, 1988 
Require central 
disclosure and make 
information publicly 
available 
• Assumes disclosed information will
reach donors









False or faithless 
agent 
Require disclosure to 
state on how money is 
spent 
• Assumes report provides sufficient
information to assess whether
solicited funds have reached the
target
Fishman, 2015 
Enforce laws against 
fraudulent statements 
and divert charitable 
resources 




oversight over agents 
(e.g., contract terms, 
additional reporting, 
background checks) 
• Difficult to enforce








reduce funds available 
for domestic causes 
Impose onerous 
registration requirements 
• Assumes out of state organizations
will be deterred
• Requirements cannot be more
burdensome on out of state charities





Generate revenue for 
State Treasury Charge and collect fees 
• Assumes fees will be paid and exceed
costs of administering the program Irvin, 2005 
Many top state charity 
officials seek higher 
political office 
High profile enforcement 
against unpopular target 
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lead to changes in donor behavior (Barber & Farwell, 2016a; Brown, Meer, & Williams, 2017; 
Cnaan, Jones, Dickin, & Salomon, 2011; Irvin, 2005; Portillo & Stinn, 2018; Sloan, 2009; Yörük 
2016). Following a review of empirical literature, one author concluded, “It strains credulity that 
a preponderance of donors would do the necessary research on a charity’s cost structure before 
writing a check…Most persons probably trust their instincts because they know the organization 
or have heard about its work” (Bowman, 2006, p. 294). Nevertheless, disclosure of information 
may have an effect at the margins particularly when these disclosures occur prior to major gifts. 
Empowering Regulators to Catch Fraud. A less common justification for solicitation registration 
requirements is that they provide information to regulators that facilitates enforcement against 
fraudulent organizations (Breen, 2013). The filed information either allows the regulator to 
uncover and spot fraud and illegal activity or it assists with additional investigations in the event 
that a complaint is brought to the regulator’s attention. Scholars have found little evidence, 
though, suggesting that registration aids enforcement of other laws; and, regulators have not 
articulated the precise way that the information disclosed aids detection of criminal activity. It is 
not even clear that the filings are read by anyone. As Fishman (2015) suggests, “Registration is 
not synonymous with enforcement of the law, oversight by the attorney general or prevention of 
fraud. Forms, once filed, are not reviewed in most jurisdictions until and unless there are 
complaints about a particular charity” (p. 16). Moreover, lax enforcement of charitable solicitation 
laws is not surprising given that there are only 355 full-time employee equivalent state level 
charity officials nationwide (Lott et al., 2016). 
Benefitting Government. Another rationale for regulatory actions taken toward charities is to 
benefit government as an institution rather than the charitable sector. For example, there may be 
a benefit resulting from government fees. These fees could be collected with at least a partial goal 
of raising revenue. Indeed, although most annual fees for registration are relatively modest, some 
states charge a substantial amount. For instance, Massachusetts charges the largest nonprofits 
more than $2,000 to register for a charitable solicitation permit (Harbor Compliance, 2016). It is 
unlikely, though, that this potential for revenue generation actually motivates any state to impose 
a registration requirement. 
Another benefit might occur if government decides to limit solicitation by organizations whose 
efforts benefit residents from other states. This limit may be imposed under concerns that this 
type of solicitation may reduce the amount of charitable funds available for their own citizenry. 
However, expressly favoring in-state organizations to out-of-state organizations is likely illegal 
(Liazos, 2000). While some states impose minor residential requirements (such as having an in-
state resident agent) and several states have refused to sign onto uniform multi-registration 
platforms that would make it easier for organizations from other jurisdictions to comply with the 
law, there is little direct evidence that solicitation laws are driven by an interest in protectionism. 
Costs of Regulating Charitable Solicitation 
Against unproven benefits, scholars have noted that compliance with charitable solicitation 
regulations carries real costs (e.g., Freemont-Smith, 2004). These scholars have estimated that 
the annual financial burden placed on soliciting nonprofits that comply with state level solicitation 
laws could reach as high $150,000 for some organizations (Irvin, 2005). This cost does not simply 
include registration fees, but it also includes staff time and other costs associated with learning 
the rules each city has and ensuring compliance by all board members, staff, and volunteers who 
might solicit donations. 
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Exacerbating the cost to charities are the nuances of laws between states. A charity soliciting 
donations nationally must comply with the laws in every state, which can include registration and 
reporting requirements and ensuring that the language that each state mandates is included in all 
solicitations. Although state laws have similar features, charities must carefully determine the 
distinct rules in every state to ensure compliance. 
Methods 
To determine the extent to which local regulation of charitable solicitation activity exists, I 
undertook a review of the laws of the 49 largest cities in the United States (drawn from the largest 
50 cities in the country, but excluding San Juan, Puerto Rico). The cities were identified using the 
2010 U.S. Census of the Population (see Table 2). Reviewing each city’s codified ordinances, I 
identified all restrictions on charitable solicitation that existed in each city. I focused only on 
ordinances that targeted charitable solicitation directly. Laws that incidentally regulated 
charitable solicitation were not included in this review. For example, a law prohibiting standing 
on a sidewalk would prohibit standing and soliciting donations, but it would not be included in 
this review because it does not target soliciting directly. 
Relevant laws were identified by conducting a full-text search of each sampled city’s codified 
ordinances for the following truncated words: “solicit!”, “donat!”, “charit!”, and “contribution!.” 
The use of truncated words allows for the identification of all words made by adding letters to the 
end of it. Trained research assistants searched through the results to identify relevant sections. 
The author, an attorney with experience in municipal law, reviewed the findings of the research 
assistants. The attorney also conducted an independent search to ensure that all laws were 
properly coded and that no other relevant laws were missing. Information about when an 
ordinance was enacted was taken from the compiler’s notes. 
Findings 
Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation 
All of the cities in this review regulate charitable solicitation in some way. Some impose strict or 
cumbersome regulations such as registration requirements or restrictions on where, when, and 
how solicitation can be conducted. Some of these mandates duplicate requirements that already 
exist at the state level, while others go far beyond state equivalents. For example, nearly 20% of 
the cities (n=9) require that organizations soliciting donations by any means (whether telephone, 
mail, advertisement, and/or electronically) register with the city beforehand. Nearly 20% of the 
cities also require that organizations soliciting by roadside or in public spaces register to solicit 
donations. All but two of the cities have location restrictions that limit soliciting donations in 
certain parts of the city. 
Registration. A handful of the cities (see Table 3) require organizations to register with the city 
(typically the Chief of Police) before soliciting donations. These requirements largely echo those 
commonly found at the state level. Several cities also impose requirements before allowing 
solicitation in public places (e.g., New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, San Antonio, Jacksonville, San 
Francisco, Fort Worth, and Charlotte), door-to-door (e.g., Nashville), or near roadways (e.g., 
Jacksonville and San Antonio). Although excluded from Table 3, a few cities have additional 
nuances to their requirements. These nuances include things like requiring registration for 
solicitation in government buildings, airports, or transit systems (e.g., Miami) or requiring 
registration for solicitation raising funds for specific causes like law enforcement (e.g., New York). 
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New York NY X 
Los Angeles CA X 
Chicago IL X 
Houston TX X X 
Philadelphia PA X X 
Phoenix AZ X X 
San Antonio TX X X 
San Diego CA X X 
Dallas TX X X X 
San Jose CA X 
Jacksonville FL X X X 
Indianapolis IN X X 
San Francisco CA X 
Austin TX X X 
Columbus OH X X 
Fort Worth TX X X 
Charlotte NC X X X 
Detroit MI X 
El Paso TX X X 
Memphis TN X 
Baltimore MD X 
Boston MA X X 
Seattle WA X 
Washington DC X X 
Nashville TN X X 
Denver CO X X 
Louisville KY X X 
Milwaukee WI X 
Portland OR X 
Las Vegas NV X X 
Oklahoma City OK X X 
Albuquerque NM X 
Tucson City AZ X X 
Fresno City CA X X 
Sacramento CA X X X 
Long Beach CA X X X 
Kansas City MO X X X 
Mesa City AZ X 
Virginia Beach VA X X 
Atlanta GA X 
Colorado Springs CO X 
Omaha City NE X X 
Raleigh NC X 
Miami FL X X 
Cleveland OH X 
Tulsa OK X X X 
Oakland CA X X X 
Minneapolis MN X X X 
Wichita KS X 
Total 44 29 6 10 
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Table 3. Local Charitable Solicitation Registration Requirements 





New York, NY  
Admin. Code 21-111 
In public or house-to-
house 
Religious organizations 1925 1999 
Los Angeles, CA  
Ord. 44.04 




Soliciting from existing 
members 
Names of all directors and officers; cost 
of fundraising. 
Must be filed 15 days before start; must 
contain information about purpose of 
funds, activities used, and costs. 
* 2003
Chicago, IL  
Ord. 10-8-080 





Soliciting from existing 
members 
Must be filed 30 days in advance; 
prohibits individuals soliciting for 
themselves. 
Must be filed 10 days in advance. 2005 2008 
San Antonio, TX 
Ord. 19-8 
Roadside None 1990 2005 
Jacksonville, FL 
§804.807
Roadside None 2002 2016 
San Francisco, CA 
Police Code Art. 9.6 
Public spaces Individuals, soliciting 
members, on personal 
property, for political 
purposes 
Requires insurance, knowledge of first 
aid, and $200 filing fee; limited to 2 
days per year. 
Only allowed twice per year; requires 
insurance; all funds must go to a state 
licensed nonprofit. 
Must file statement of registration with 
extensive financials; each solicitor must 









and schools, to members, 
for less than $500 per year 
Must be filed 30 days in advance; 
separate permitting for roadside. 
1959 2017 




None 1959 2017 
Fort Worth, TX 
Ord. 30-7 
Roadside None 1964 2011 
Memphis, TN 
6-64-3 
Any means Houses of worship 
Information about the solicitor and the 
plan of solicitation; a bond. 
Only two days per year; must have 
approved signs and an insurance policy; 
all solicitors must be 18 years old. 
“...all such information…as may be of 
assistance to the board in determining 
whether the permit shall be given;” 
requires a “proper proportion” of 
money go to cause.  
1967 1985 
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District of Columbia  
Code 44-1701 et seq. 
Any means Religious organizations, 
soliciting from members, 
American Red Cross 





Any means Houses of worship, 




Las Vegas, NV 
Chapter 11.62 
Roadside None 1991 1991 
Las Vegas, NV 
Chapter 6.78 
Event promotion by 
professional  
None 1984 2015 
Oklahoma City, OK 
Ord. Ch. 13, Art. II  
Any means Soliciting from members 
Registration form with detailed info 
(including social security numbers) on 
solicitors as well as time and location 
of solicitation. 
Five business days in advance; street 
address of organization; proof that 
organization has 501(c)(3) tax exempt 
status; agreement to indemnify city. 
Information about all events promoted; 
descriptions of events; payment of all 
inspection costs at hourly rate. 
Registration form every three months. 1980 1993 
Albuquerque, NM 
Ch. 13, Art. X 
Professional 
fundraiser 
None 1970 2007 
Fresno City, CA 
Ch. 9, Art. 7 
Professional 
fundraiser 
None 1983 1983 
Long Beach, CA 
Ch. 5.28 






Plan to solicit; information about 
criminal records of employees; filing a 
bond; must disclose amount spent on 
fundraiser to potential donors. 
Terms of compensation; period of 
soliciting. 
File authorization for each solicitor with 
police dept; requires permit with 
fingerprints of paid solicitors. 
1986 2010 
Virginia Beach, VA 
26-50 
Any means Organizations registered 
with state, several other 
categories 
Names and addresses of directors; 




Any means Soliciting members Statement that costs will not exceed 16% 
of direct gifts; statement that no one will 
be paid to conduct telephone 
solicitation; detailed financial 
information; statement of need for 
donations. 
1956 1974 
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Means Covered. The broadest solicitation laws require any organization soliciting donations from 
a city resident to register—without specifying method of contact. Los Angeles, for example, 
requires registration for “[a]ny oral or written request for a charitable contribution made, 
transmitted, or distributed by any means,” except that it exempts emails and websites in some 
instances (Ord. § 44.01). Similarly, Columbus registers charitable solicitation by any means 
“either directly or indirectly” (Ord. § 525.01). In 2017, the city added language to clarify explicitly 
that its registration requirements apply to email, social media, and mass media solicitations 
(while continuing to cover telephone and telegraph) (Ord. § 525.15). Houston in contrast limits 
the scope of its charitable solicitation registration requirements to in-person and telephone 
requests that take place within city limits (Ord. § 36-71). Other cities (e.g., New York) only require 
registration when solicitation takes place in person. 
Although state laws imposing extensive regulations on professional fundraisers are common, a 
few cities (e.g., Columbus, Fresno, and Albuquerque) have similar laws. With these exceptions, 
cities do not mimic state laws that impose heightened burdens on professional fundraising firms. 
Exemptions. Like their state counterparts, city registration rules often exempt religious 
organizations and those that solicit exclusively from members. Although, specific requirements 
can vary. However, unlike state level registration requirements that often exempt smaller 
organizations, the cities in the present review have no such exemption for organizations with 
small amounts of revenue. 
Notably, most of the cities that impose broad registration requirements are located in states that 
have similar state level requirements. These requirements may have been established without 
considering the state level mandates. Only one city exempts organizations that are registered at 
the state level (Virginia Beach), while another (Louisville) requires organizations registered with 
the state to re-sign and submit the state registration form to the city. Many of the other cities 
impose extensive registration and regulatory requirements on organizations—even when those 
same organizations are regulated at the state level. 
Scope of Requirements. Of the cities that require registration, most mandate that nonprofits file 
information about organizational finances, particularly how much revenue is anticipated and how 
much will be spent on the solicitation. This often must be done 10 to 30 days in advance of the 
solicitation. Some of the cities require the intended use of the funds to be specified. A few of the 
cities require detailed information about the people affiliated with the organization. Some, for 
example, require names and addresses of directors. Others require disclosure of criminal history 
of anyone involved with the solicitation. Additionally, some of the cities require nonprofits to 
submit the text of their solicitations. A few of the cities even request more specific information. 
Oakland, for example, requires an assurance that the costs of the solicitation will not exceed 16%. 
Cities that also restrict roadside solicitation often have insurance requirements and require 
disclosure of the exact day(s), time(s), and location(s) of the solicitation. 
Enforcement and Use. Scholars have found little evidence of vigorous enforcement of charitable 
solicitation laws at the state level (Fishman, 2015). The same is likely true at the local level. 
Columbus, for example, has a Charitable Solicitation Board as well as at least one staff member 
devoted to charitable solicitation. Yet, the city indicated in response to a public record request 
that it had undertaken no enforcement actions in the prior two years despite hundreds of 
organizations registering with the city. Indeed, from January 1, 2015 to July 12, 2017 there were 
402 organizations that received a charitable solicitation permit from the City of Columbus. No 
organization that applied during this time was denied a permit. Interestingly, since this time there 
has been no organization prosecuted for failure to comply. 
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A review of the webpages of the cities in this article shows that Washington, DC is the only locale 
that provides electronic access to registration forms (for prior use of this methodology, see Barber, 
2013). For most of the cities, information filed by charities must be requested via a written public 
records request along with payment of copying and processing fees. These burdens associated 
with accessing information make it unlikely that potential donors will benefit from the 
information provided. 
Regulating Public Solicitations 
Only a handful of the cities in this review have broad registration requirements, but almost every 
city has some spatial restrictions on solicitation. Ordinances that restrict charitable solicitation 
activities according to space or location typically fall into three categories. First, nearly all of the 
cities regulate solicitation in public places such as sidewalks or parks, restricting or even banning 
solicitation in some areas. Second, some laws restrict standing on roadways with the intent to 
communicate with passing motorists. Although the present review captures only cities that 
regulate solicitation expressly, some of the cities also rely on laws intended to prohibit loitering 
on public medians to limit roadside solicitation (Cutting v. Portland Maine, 2015). Finally, many 
local governments have laws regulating door-to-door “peddlers,” which is a term that has 
sometimes been defined to include solicitation. These laws require solicitor registration and they 
also limit the hours of solicitation activities. As the number of solicitors traveling house-to-house 
has decreased, though, these laws have become somewhat archaic and are rarely invoked. 
Sidewalks and Solicitation Free Zones. Almost every city in this review has some restrictions on 
in-person solicitation on sidewalks. Two exceptions are Cleveland (which repealed its sidewalk 
solicitation ordinance in mid-2017 following a lawsuit) and Virginia Beach (which repealed its 
ordinance in early 2018 out of concerns that it was unconstitutional). These laws are often titled 
“panhandling” or “aggressive solicitation” laws. They typically work by establishing 10, 20, or even 
50-foot buffer zones around certain places such as the entrances to buildings, parking structures, 
intersections, bus stops, and parks. 
Other cities create “solicitation free zones.” These zones are usually in downtown business 
districts (e.g., Atlanta Ord. 106-85 and Memphis Ord. 6-56-3). Memphis also prohibits sitting on 
a bench while soliciting (Ord. 6-56-5); and, both Memphis and Seattle outlaw soliciting anywhere 
in a public park (Memphis Ord. 12-84-10 and Seattle Ord. 18.12.150). 
Laws against soliciting on transit systems and on airport property are also common. Although no 
city in this review followed a total ban approach, an earlier survey found that several smaller cities 
nationwide have banned face-to-face solicitations (National Law Center on Homelessness & 
Poverty, 2014). Such a citywide ban, though, has never survived a judicial challenge (Speet v. 
Schuette, 2013). 
Many solicitation laws that focus on sidewalks and the creation of solicitation free zones also often 
contain restrictions on the manner in which solicitations can be conducted. Common prohibitions 
include bans on “abusive” comments (e.g., Boston Ord. 16-41), bans on asking someone to 
reconsider a “no” response (e.g., San Antonio Ord. Art. I, 21-29), and restrictions on the time of 
day that solicitations can occur. Some prohibit children from soliciting (e.g., Detroit Ord. 33-4-5), 
while others prohibit groups of two or more from soliciting (e.g., Denver Ord. 38-132 and 
Minneapolis Ord. 385.60). Solicitation in these laws is usually defined as a request for an 
immediate donation by any means. There are some exempt nonverbal solicitations (e.g., when 
solicitors merely hold a sign). 
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Although these laws lack an explicit exemption for nonprofit solicitation, it is possible that law 
enforcement officials may target individual solicitors (i.e., panhandlers) rather than individuals 
working on behalf of an organized charity. In fact, many solicitation laws are labelled as 
ordinances targeting “panhandling,” which is behavior typically associated with individual 
solicitation rather than nonprofits. However, as one court noted:  
While the plaintiff here has focused the inquiry on the effects of the 
ordinance on the poor and homeless, the ordinance itself is not so 
limited. It applies with equal force to anyone who would solicit a 
charitable contribution, whether for a recognized charity, a 
religious group, a political candidate or organization, or for an 
individual. It would punish street people as well as Salvation Army 
bell ringers outside stores at Christmas, so long as the appeal 
involved a vocal request for an immediate donation. (Gresham v. 
Peterson, 2000, p. 903) 
Over the years, there have been legal challenges to restrictions on sidewalk solicitation (Loper v. 
New York, 1993). In the 20 years from 1995 to 2015, federal courts across the country reached 
differing conclusions about the constitutionality of soliciting on sidewalks. However, after 
Supreme Court decisions in 2014 and 2015 clarified the legal standard in First Amendment cases, 
courts began striking down restrictions on sidewalk solicitations consistently whenever they were 
challenged (Barmore, 2016; Lauriello, 2016; Mead, 2015). Still, as seen in Table 3, restrictions on 
sidewalk solicitations remain common (44 of the 49 cities in this review place restrictions on 
sidewalk solicitations). 
Roadside Solicitations. Although not as common as restrictions on sidewalk solicitations, many 
of the cities (29 out of the 49) restrict or ban roadside solicitations. Complete bans are a common 
approach (e.g., Indianapolis Ord. 407-102 and Charlotte 14-282). However, some of the cities, 
like San Jose, prohibit roadside solicitations only in certain high traffic areas designated as no 
solicitation zones. 
A few of the cities allow roadside solicitations but impose extensive limits. Jacksonville, for 
example, prohibits roadside solicitations without a permit. Moreover, the city will only issue such 
a permit to a nonprofit organization registered with the state (Ord. 804.807). In addition to this 
prohibition , the organization must provide proof of a million dollar insurance policy and may not 
solicit more than two days at a time (or two times in a year). Individuals under 21 years of age are 
not allowed to participate in roadside solicitations in the city; and, all roadside solicitations in 
Jacksonville must take place during the day. 
Kansas City has similar restrictions but also requires signs to be placed around the solicitation as 
well as the presence of a police officer at all times (Ord. 50-8.5). Las Vegas also has similar 
requirements but will only issue a permit to an organization that is federally tax-exempt (Ord. § 
11.62.020). In the past few years, there have been a few successful legal challenges to roadside 
solicitation restrictions, particularly when the ban is complete rather than tailored (Barmore, 
2016). Still, these ordinances remain common. 
Door-to-Door Solicitations. Somewhat narrower are laws that restrict or regulate door-to-door 
solicitations. These laws are justified on the basis of privacy interests in one’s residence, safety 
concerns that someone might use a door-to-door solicitation as a cover for investigating a criminal 
target, and the desire that people have to be left alone in their own homes (e.g., Dallas Ord. 42-1). 
Although regulation of door-to-door solicitations is common, only a fraction of the ordinances 
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that regulate door-to-door solicitations are specifically intended for charitable purposes. More 
common regulations apply to commercial solicitors seeking to sell a product; and, these 
regulations often expressly exempt charitable solicitations (e.g., Nashville Ord. 6.64.010).  
Ordinances that do include door-to-door charitable solicitations usually limit the time of day a 
solicitation can take place. These ordinances also often prohibit solicitors from visiting a residence 
that has a “no solicitation” sign displayed. A few cities require solicitors to obtain permits prior to 
starting a door-to-door campaign (e.g., Jacksonville Ord. 250.701). A registration requirement 
prior to door-to-door canvassing (such as “get-out-the-vote” efforts) was struck down by the 
Supreme Court in 2002. The Court however left open the possibility that door-to-door charitable 
solicitors could be required to register, provided that the registration was prompt and ministerial 
(Watchtower v. Village of Straton, 2002). 
Donation Boxes. In recent years, cities have begun regulating unattended donation receptacles 
that allow people to donate used clothes and/or other items (Gasseling, 2017). These regulations, 
however, are relatively rare compared to the regulation of solicitations conducted by individuals. 
Only a few cities in this review (10 out of 49) placed restrictions on where donation receptacles 
could be located or imposed permitting requirements. San Antonio, for example, requires permits 
for all unattended containers, prohibits placing a container within 200 feet of a residential 
property, and limits the size of containers used for donations to four cubic feet (Ord. § 16-913). 
Miami prohibits the use of donation bins throughout the city (Ord. § 22-161); and, at least one 
city, Charlotte, regulates donation facilities (not just the containers). This city also imposes size 
limits on donation bins and requires that bins be monitored while donations are being accepted 
(Charlotte Ord. § 12.532.1). 
Because donation bins invariably display signage signifying that they are being used for the 
purpose of soliciting a donation, organizations that utilize these bins are able to rely on First 
Amendment rights. Courts have reached different views, though, regarding the lawfulness of 
restrictions on donation receptacles. Some courts have struck down total or overly restrictive bans 
but have upheld more limited regulations on receptacle location (Recycle for Change v. City of 
Oakland, 2017). In 2014, the Kentucky Attorney General issued a memorandum urging cities to 
proceed cautiously when regulating donation receptacles. The Secondary Materials and Recycled 
Textiles Association drafted a model ordinance for cities that encourages a permitting system 
rather than an outright ban on these receptables (“For Communities,” n.d.). 
Discussion 
Comparing Local Interests to State 
Although some cities have adopted solicitation registration requirements that mirror state 
requirements, the bulk of local level regulation of charitable solicitation is driven by spatial 
concerns. Indeed, rather than focusing on empowering donors, preventing fraud, or the diversion 
of resources, which have been the dominant purposes behind state level charitable solicitation 
laws as discussed by others (see Table 1), most city regulations are related much more closely to 
traffic flow, avoiding annoyances at people’s homes, or concerns about in-person solicitation in 
certain areas. This suggests, then, that although most cities are concerned about charitable 
solicitation enough to regulate it, they regulate it differently than states; and, they regulate it for 
different reasons than states. 
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Interjurisdictional (Non-)Cooperation 
It is perhaps a bit surprising that more cities do not coordinate with overlapping state laws when 
specifying their regulatory requirements. If the purpose of cities occupying this regulatory space 
is to fill a void left by states, then we would expect to see rules that supplement rather than simply 
replicate state laws. Instead, we find city ordinances requiring registration are, on their face, 
indifferent to the existence of similar state laws. In fact, only a single city in this review explicitly 
exempted local filing requirements for organizations that had already registered with the state 
(Virginia Beach Chapter 26, Article III). That city’s decision to do so is likely because state law 
expressly preempts this type of ordinance (Virginia Code § 57-63). 
Instead of coordinating with state law, a few of the cities in this review provide exemptions for 
organizations that are federally tax-exempt. For example, federal tax laws have nothing to say 
about roadway safety, yet some city laws permit federally tax-exempt organizations to solicit near 
roadways due to their federal tax status alone (e.g., Las Vegas Ord. § 11.62.020). It is unclear, 
though, why federal tax status is relevant for soliciting donations near roadways. There is also no 
obvious explanation as to why a city would rely on federal tax-exempt status to exempt charitable 
organizations from solicitation filing requirements rather than an organization’s compliance with 
state charitable solicitation registration rules. 
Because city registration requirements predate state laws (Freemont-Smith, 2004, p.370), one 
explanation could possibility be that cities simply have not undertaken the effort to consider the 
role that their laws continue to play in light of similar state requirements. Indeed, local 
governments were an early innovator in the regulation of charitable solicitation. Although many 
charitable solicitation ordinances for the cities in this review date back to 1980 or earlier, as shown 
in Table 3, nearly all of the cities have enacted amendments to their ordinances in recent years. 
For example, Columbus undertook major revisions to its registration requirements in 2017. These 
revisions included amending the approval process and clarifying that the requirements applied to 
electronic forms of solicitation. Despite this revision, the city did not deduplicate or streamline 
registration requirements that overlapped with state law. It is possible, then, that cities may be 
willing to update their laws but not rethink the major policy choices that led to developing the 
regulation in the first place. It is also possible that cities may not be willing to revisit how their 
laws fit into the broader regulatory environment. The local legislative processes involved warrant 
further exploration beyond the scope of this article. For present purposes, it suffices to observe 
that at least some cities maintain and update local registration requirements for charities without 
considering the duplication of the requirement. 
Indifference to Constitutional Rights of Charities 
Although a full analysis of the nuanced constitutional limits to charitable solicitation are beyond 
the scope of this article, some of the cities in this review have laws that directly conflict with court 
rulings. This finding of constitutional issues is consistent with Hopkins and Kirkpatrick’s (2013, 
p. 74) observation that governments continue to enforce many unconstitutional laws against 
charities realizing that charities are unlikely to invest the time or money necessary to bring a 
successful court challenge. Oakland, for example, refuses to allow any organization to solicit 
donations if it spends more than a set percentage (16% of direct gifts) on the solicitation. The city 
does so even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down similar provisions (Riley v. 
National Federation for the Blind of North Carolina, 1988). Notably, Oakland also has not 
amended its solicitation law in nearly forty years. 
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Other cities allow officials wide discretion to decide what information must be supplied by 
organizations and whether a permit should be granted (e.g., Memphis and Columbus). These 
allowances run afoul of decades of Supreme Court cases (Cox v. Louisiana, 1965; City of 
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 1988). Finally, city restrictions for soliciting on sidewalks 
have not survived a court challenge in several years, yet these laws remain on the books in nearly 
every city. However, some cities have begun to repeal laws regulating charitable solicitation. In 
2017, Wichita repealed its law requiring a permit before allowing roadside soliciting. 
By maintaining laws that are susceptible to court challenge, it may seem that cities are 
disinterested in ensuring the constitutional integrity of their laws or taking proactive steps to 
respect constitutional rights of charities in their cities (Vogelsang-Coombs, 2012). However, in 
light of the increasing amount of constitutional litigation over solicitation laws at the local level, 
cities may want to consider whether the benefits of their registration requirements and other 
regulations are warranted when compared to the potential costs imposed on nonprofits and on 
city officials. A closer examination of constitutional rules is a fruitful topic for future study. 
Conclusion 
This article adds to the literature by revealing the existence and extent of local regulation of 
charitable solicitation. Much of the existing scholarly literature has overlooked the local 
dimension of regulating charitable solicitation. However, a law overlooked by scholars is still a 
law and nonprofits are expected to follow it. 
Because enforcement of laws regulating the nonprofit sector is notoriously lax at the federal and 
state levels (Fishman, 2015), the potential oversight exercised by local governments could fill a 
gap left by these other entities. With overlapping regulation, though, comes new costs for 
charities. Indeed, compliance with innumerable local regulations (in addition to similar state 
laws) could pose a significant barrier to nonprofits when attempting to communicate their 
mission to potential supporters. 
For cities, then, this article highlights the need for officials to think carefully about the benefits 
and costs associated with different forms of charitable solicitation regulation at the local level, 
particularly when considering regulatory efforts conducted by other levels of government. As 
cities continue to update and amend their charitable solicitation laws—and as a new wave of 
constitutional challenges to charitable solicitation laws emerge—my hope is that future research 
will continue to grow our understanding of the local regulation of charities. 
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